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Debate about the behavior of the banking sector has intensiﬁed in the popular press, as well
as within academia, as the ﬁnancial crisis continues to gather steam. Many of the questions
raised about the behavior of banks during the current crisis rely on net aggregate data on
bank lending activity. However, the banking sector is very heterogeneous and aggregate data
can be hard to interpret if not combined with observations at the individual bank level, as
argued in Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (2008) and Cohen-Cole, Duygan-Bump, Fillat, and
Montoriol-Garriga (2008).
In this paper, we use publicly available balance sheet data for the entire population of
commercial banks to construct quarterly gross credit ﬂows for the U.S. banking system
during the period 1999:Q1-2008:Q4 and to provide new evidence about the behavior of
regulated commercial banks during the ﬁnancial crisis that began in 2007. Loosely speaking,
the weighted sum of positive changes in credit for banks that increased loans is a measure
of credit expansion, while the weighted sum of negative changes in credit is a measure of
credit contraction. While net ﬂows are a measure of aggregate credit change in the overall
economy, gross ﬂows are a measure of how much credit is expanding and contracting or
the reallocation of lending across borrowers. Although we use comprehensive balance sheet
data to calculate our measures of credit contraction and expansion, we caution that without
actual loan origination data or a careful accounting for unused loan commitments, we cannot
capture the complete dynamics of credit ﬂows for commercial banks and therefore our results
should be interpreted cautiously.
Several recent papers have highlighted the importance of considering gross credit ﬂows rather
2than net lending, in both a domestic context where credit is provided by banks (Dell’Ariccia
and Garibaldi, 2005; Craig and Haubrich, 2006) and ﬁrms (Herrera, Kolar, and Minetti,
2007) and an international context where credit is provided by countries (Contessi, De Pace,
and Francis, 2008). In the banking sector, aggregate changes obscure changes in gross
lending and the heterogeneous patterns of contraction and expansion within regions, sectors,
and groups of banks. Moreover, the elements determining bank-level credit expansion are
fundamentally diﬀerent from those of credit contraction. When banks increase lending, they
face informational asymmetries and the costs of information acquisition, searching for new
clients, or evaluating new projects. Conversely, when loans are retired due to expiry or non-
performance, diﬀerent costs occur, which depend on the liquidity of borrowers and on the
steps that must be taken to ensure repayment. The diﬀerent activities underlying expansion
and contraction lead to diﬀerent cyclical properties and volatility measures that we discuss
in this paper.1
We follow two steps in our analysis of gross loan ﬂows. First, we present several ﬁndings
about gross credit ﬂows in the U.S. banking system between 1999:Q1 and 2008:Q4 and use
previous estimates by Dell’Ariccia and Garibaldi (2005) as our main term of comparison;
a similar paper by Craig and Haubrich (2006) focuses more on entry and exit, which are
relatively less important for the period we study.2 We then focus on the recent ﬁnancial
crisis and compare behavior during the current recession to the previous four recessions to
put current behavior in context.
Our results reveal that gross ﬂows are much larger than net ﬂows, so at any phase of the
business cycle, signiﬁcant credit contraction and credit expansion co-exist. We also ﬁnd
3signiﬁcant credit contraction and expansion within banks of similar size, categories of loan -
real estate, individual, commercial and industrial (C&I) - and across states. Even with the
signiﬁcant restructuring of the U.S. banking system and attendant reduction in the number
of banks between the Dell’Ariccia and Garibaldi (2005) sample (1979 to 1999) and ours (1999
to 2008) and an increase in the size of the average bank, we ﬁnd that a substantial amount
of heterogeneity remains. Moreover, the heterogeneity in aggregate credit cycles cannot be
explained by diﬀerences across states or across the types of loans or sizes of banks. In terms
of volatility of gross ﬂows, we ﬁnd that the expansion is more volatile than the contraction,
and both are larger than the volatility of GDP. Finally and importantly, expansion is also
more volatile than credit contraction for each loan category except C&I loans. All but the
last result are consistent with previous evidence.
In the second part of the paper, we use gross credit ﬂow measures to compare bank lending
during the recession that began in December 2007 to the patterns observed during previous
recessions.3 In the lead-up to the current recession, credit had expanded strongly in the
fourth quarter of 2007, particularly for C&I loans, which is a pattern typically observed pre-
ceding peaks of economic activity. During the current recession credit expansion contracted
sharply from the fourth quarter of 2007 to the ﬁrst quarter of 2008 while credit contraction
began to mildly rise. During the ﬁrst three quarters of 2008, the behavior of our contraction
and expansion series was similar to other recessions. Real estate loans and loans to C&I
ﬁrms maintained relatively low but positive net growth rates through the third quarter of
2008. The picture substantially changes in the fourth quarter of 2008, when our measure of
credit contraction becomes larger than credit expansion, a pattern observed only during the
41990-91 recession. Those years also witnessed the peak of the Savings and Loan crisis. We
also examine the increasing use of existing commitments of various types of loans; for C&I
ﬁrms this is likely a good explanation of why net credit growth was slow but not negative
during the ﬁrst three quarters of 2008. Thus, although net credit growth in the commercial
banking sector was positive through the third quarter of 2008, even the data on the quantity
of commercial banks loans for the fourth quarter show signs of distress in the industry.
The reader should be aware that our study is subject to various caveats. (i) Our comparison
of the current crisis with previous recessions may be distorted by the many changes that have
occurred over the past 30 years as banks have moved beyond the traditional role of providing
loans to their customers. Because the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 allowed
various types of ﬁnancial institutions besides banks to freely merge and compete for loans,
our sample is aﬀected by this activity more so than the sample prior to 1999. (ii) The
diﬀusion of securitization necessitates caution in the interpretation of our results as it may
be that we observe ﬂows that appear as loan expansion simply because they can no longer
be redistributed and transformed from regular loans to securities. An even larger credit
contraction may have occurred in the non-regulated banking sector, without visibly aﬀecting
our data on insured banks. (iii) Regulated commercial banks provide (at most) only one-third
of the total credit to ﬁrms in the U.S. economy (Feldman and Lueck, 2007). Thus, the fact
that we do not observe unusual distress in the regulated banking sector until 2008:Q4 does
not imply that ﬁrms had easy access to credit in the previous quarters. (iv) Our measures of
loan activity for 2008 may be aﬀected by the programs implemented by the Treasury and the
Federal Reserve and may have been very diﬀerent without these interventions. (v) Although
5we use comprehensive balance sheet data to determine measures of credit contraction and
expansion, we may not account for cases where individual banks expanded and contracted
within the same quarter nor have our basic measures taken into account loan commitments.4
(vi) We try to document a series of facts, not explain them. Further research is necessary
to understand the causes and consequences of such observations. In particular, it should
be noted that we do not analyze the changes in the cost of borrowing, nor we are able to
disentangle demand from supply eﬀects.
II The Debate about the Evidence of a Credit Crunch
A vivid debate developed in the fall of 2008 about the evidence of a credit crunch in aggregate
and disaggregate data. The ﬁrst contribution to the debate was provided by Chari, Chris-
tiano, and Kehoe (2008, CKK henceforth) and used the H8 data from the Federal Reserve
System that contain diﬀerent categories of total assets and liabilities.5 Total assets include
(i) bank credit, (ii) interbank loans, (iii) cash assets, and (iv) other assets. Bank credit is
the sum of securities (Treasury and agency securities, other securities) and loans and leases
in bank credit. Loans and leases, the focus of our analysis in the next sections, is composed
of C&I loans, real estate loans, consumer loans, security loans, and other loans and leases.
CKK used the H8 data (available until October 15, 2008, at the time of the authors’ writing)
to discuss three “myths,” or misconceptions, about lending during the crisis, speciﬁcally:
“(i) Bank lending to non-ﬁnancial corporations and individuals has declined sharply. (ii)
Interbank lending is essentially nonexistent. (iii) Commercial paper issuance by non-ﬁnancial
corporations has declined sharply, and rates have risen to unprecedented levels” (CKK, p. 1).
6CKK showed that the credit freeze was not evident in the aggregate data on commercial bank
loans through October 15, 2008, and suggested that spreads are diﬃcult to interpret in times
of crisis because investors “ﬂy to safety,” that is, they rush to buy to Treasury bonds, whose
real return accordingly falls. A plot of these weekly data for the period between January
1999 and February 2009 shows that the lack of a major credit contraction in aggregate data
as pointed out in CKK extends to the end of 2008, although one can now observe a mild
decrease of each type of loan in the fourth quarter. Most series appear to grow along a trend
and then show a small decline in the last part of 2008 with two notable exceptions.6 (i) The
interbank lending series experienced a sharp drop between the end of September and early
December before beginning to recover at the end of 2008; (ii) cash assets increased sharply
in the fall of 2008 after staying basically ﬂat (in nominal terms) until the end of 2008:Q3;
they reached a level of more than $1 trillion at the end of 2008. Cash assets include deposits
at the Federal Reserve Banks that have boomed since October 9, 2008, when the Federal
Reserve System initiated interest payments on deposits at its Banks, as authorized by the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act.7
The original CKK paper triggered a reply by (Cohen-Cole, Duygan-Bump, Fillat, and
Montoriol-Garriga, 2008, CDFM, henceforth) at the Boston Fed and a further Comment
by Christiano (2008).8 The gist of the CDFM reply is that (i) credit markets’ troubles are
evident in the data on spreads, (ii) a deeper look at disaggregated data shows evidence of
the credit squeeze, and (iii) the increase in use of existing credit lines could explain part of
the net credit growth. The authors suggest multiple reasons why aggregate data show no
decline. (i) “Securitization” has basically disappeared and banks cannot repackage loans and
7move them oﬀ their balance sheets. (ii) New lending may have collapsed while the use of
loan commitments and lines of credit in the Call Reports appears to have increased to levels
comparable to the Savings and Loan crisis of the early 1990s. (iii) There is clear evidence of
cash hoarding by large banks.
A paper by Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) provided further thoughts about the lending
squeeze by showing that new syndicated loans to C&I companies dropped substantially
during the ﬁnancial crisis.9 The amount of new loans to large borrowers in September
through November 2008 ($233 billion) had fallen by 37 percent relative to June through
August 2008 and by 68 percent relative to March through May 2007 ($726 billion), the
peak of lending. New lending for capital expenditures fell to the same extent as new lending
for restructuring (leveraged buy-outs, mergers and acquisitions, and share repurchases). The
evidence based on syndicated loans also points to an increase in drawdowns of revolving credit
facilities, particularly by low-credit-quality ﬁrms concerned about their access to funding.
Therefore, new loans to large corporations steeply declined, particularly in October 2008.
In the next sections, we discuss some of the questions raised in those papers. We study
the asset side of bank balance sheet data and focus on loans and leases to understand the
underlying microeconomic determinants of the aggregate behavior emerging in the H8 data.
The new evidence we provide is important for two reasons. First, we look at detailed micro
data - namely, the entire population of regulated U.S. commercial banks - and all types of
loans, not only syndicated loans. Second, we combine our series for the period between 1999
and 2008 with at least some of the series provided by Dell’Ariccia and Garibaldi (2005) and
highlight the diﬀerences and analogies between the crisis and recession that began in 2007
8and previous recessions.
III Data and Methodology
The ﬁrst data source we use is the publicly available Reports of Condition and Income
database (commonly called Call Report Files).10 These ﬁles contain quarterly bank-level
balance sheet information for all banks regulated by the Federal Reserve System, Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Comptroller of the Currency. In this dataset, banks
report their individual-entity lending activities on a consolidated basis for the entire group of
banks owned by the reporting entity. We used the data available at the time of this writing
covering the quarters between 1999:Q1 and 2008:Q4 and encompassing the 2001 recession
and the start of the recession that began in December 2007. The number of banks ﬁling
Call Reports fell from 14,949 in 1979 to 9,639 in 1998 but thereafter decreased by a much
smaller fraction to about 8,000 entities 10 years later. We observe 7,944 banks in the last
quarter of data we use. In order to take into account consolidation, entry, and exit that took
place during the quarters covered by our sample in our analysis, we match the Call Report
data with the National Information Center’s (NIC) transformation table available from the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.11 We also need to account for several
problems generated by commercial banks’ acquisition of ﬁnancial institutions that do not
ﬁle Call Reports. (See the end of this section.)
Following Dell’Ariccia and Garibaldi (2005), we create two measures of credit expansion
and contraction that we further use to determine measures of gross ﬂows, net ﬂows, and
credit reallocation in excess of net credit changes. The two measures are called nominal and
9idiosyncratic. In the rest of this section, we describe the computation of these measures.
For each bank i and period t, li,t is the value of nominal loans in one quarter and ∆li,t =
li,t − li,t−1 is the change in total loans. From this baseline deﬁnition, we make adjustments
to take into account mergers and acquisitions as well as failures.
We deﬁne “loan creation” as the sum of the change in bank loans at all banks that increased
their loans since the previous quarter; we deﬁne “loan destruction” as the absolute value
of the decrease in loans at all banks that decreased their loans since the previous quarter.
In other words, a bank expands credit in a given period if its credit growth is positive and
contracts credit in a given period if its credit growth is negative. Then “gross ﬂows” is the
sum of creation and destruction (whereas “net ﬂows” is the diﬀerence between the two). In
order to aggregate our data from individual bank Call Reports, we need to correct loan ﬂows
for mergers and acquisitions; otherwise our aggregate will be subject to double counting.
For example, if bank i (the surviving bank) acquires bank j (the non-surviving bank) in
period t, then the loan portfolio for bank j is zero or lj,t = 0, while the loan portfolio for
the surviving bank includes the previous balances of the acquired bank plus its net loan
changes, or ∆li,t = li,t−1+∆li,t+lj,t−1+∆lj,t−1. Thus, we need to adjust the change in bank
i0s loans by subtracting the loans of bank j in t−1 from the change in bank i0s loans and add
them to the diﬀerence for bank j. The adjusted change in the loan portfolios should then be
∆˜ li,t = ∆li,t−
PN
k=1 φik(t)lk,t−1−ψi(t)∆li,t, where φik(t) is an indicator function that takes a
value of 1 if bank i acquires bank k at some s between t−1 and t and the value 0 otherwise.
Thus, if bank k is acquired by bank i, its loans from the previous period are subtracted from
the raw change in bank i0s loan portfolio. Similarly, ψi(t) is an indicator function that is
10equal to 1 if bank i is itself acquired (by some other bank) between period t−1 and t. Thus,
we keep the changes in an acquired bank’s loan portfolio with the acquired bank for the
period of acquisition and remove them from the acquiring bank. There are two exceptions
to this rule: If the non-surviving bank was divided among several banks, unless we could
otherwise determine what share of the loans the acquiring banks received, we divided the
changes in lending of the acquired bank by the number of acquiring banks and removed part
of the new credit from each of the acquiring banks. The other exception is if the original
bank survives the merger or acquisition (keeps its own charter); in that case, we leave all the
changes in credit with the original bank and none with the newly formed bank or banks.
We used data from the NIC to identify when banks experienced a transformation - for
example, a merger or acquisition (either as the acquirer or acquiree) with discontinuation
of one of the involved bank’s charter, a split, sale of assets, or merger without a charter
discontinuation or a failure. These data were matched with Call Report data on bank balance
sheets and used to adjust loan totals (and subcategories of loans). In our 40 quarters of data,
there were roughly 2,335 mergers and acquisitions where the acquired bank’s charter was
discontinued, and 126 failures where the non-surviving bank’s assets were apportioned to
other banks and regulator agencies and the non-surviving bank’s charter was discontinued.
Notably, for the period between 1999:Q1 and 2008:Q4, 42 of 126 failures occurred in 2008
and 16 in the fourth quarter of 2008. If we exclude data from the third and fourth quarter
of 2008, bank failures average less than 1 per quarter (0.63). Including the failures through
the end of 2008 roughly doubles this ﬁgure. We adjusted the balance sheet data to take
into consideration the two cases where one of the banks involved in a transformation (an
11acquisition, merger, or failure) lost its charter. Consistent with Dell’Ariccia and Garibaldi
(2005), we ignored instances where banks transferred assets to other banks but retained their
charter.
During 2008 various ﬁnancial institutions began to ﬁle Call Reports, either because they ac-
quired a charter (Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, and American Express) or
because they were acquired by regulated commercial banks. Although our adjustment pro-
cedure treats the acquisition of commercial banks by other commercial banks (for example,
the acquisition of Wachovia by Wells Fargo12) very smoothly, acquisition of ﬁnancial entities
that did not previously ﬁle Call Reports must be treated with special care. In particular,
the acquisition of Washington Mutual (WaMu) by JPMorgan Chase on September 26, 2008,
creates a non-trivial problem for our data because the size of these banks’ loans potentially
biases our growth measures if we do not account for them properly. Speciﬁcally, WaMu was
a “thrift” until the acquisition and, as such, ﬁled Thrift Reports with the Oﬃce of Thrift
Supervision until 2008:Q2.13 With the acquisition by JPMorgan Chase, all loans on the
asset side of WaMu’s balance sheet were reported in the Call Report of JPMorgan Chase
in 2008:Q3. Therefore, we are forced to amend our methodology to account for this event,
which would otherwise signiﬁcantly distort our measures of loan expansion and contraction
in 2008:Q3 and 2008:Q4. We use two ad hoc procedures: (i) We construct an additional set
of contraction and extraction series by excluding WaMu and JPMorgan Chase for the entire
sample we study; and (ii) we modify the series of loans reported by JPMorgan Chase by
including WaMu’s Thrift Reports for the entire period for which they are available on the
website of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (i.e., 2001:Q1-2008:Q2),
12and then using the Call Reports of JPMorgan Chase for 2008:Q3 and 2008:Q4 when they
include the loans made by WaMu.14
Another important issue we face with the economic interpretation of the data is that we
cannot distinguish between two diﬀerent events that can cause credit to contract: loan
write-oﬀs for failed and defaulted loans or loans that are not rolled over upon expiry. To the
extent that diﬀerent mechanisms are involved in these two types of credit contraction, our
analysis is not able to distinguish between them.15
We reconstruct the gross ﬂows, step by step, using the following procedure: (i) We ﬁrst
compute adjusted credit growth rates ˜ git, deﬁned as ˜ git = ∆˜ lit/[0.5 ∗ (lit−1 + lit)], i.e., the
ratio between the adjusted change in total loans between t and t − 1, ∆˜ lit, and the average
value of loans between t and t − 1, a variable that bounds the adjusted credit growth rate
between -2 and +2. Naturally ˜ git is positive for the generic bank i if it has expanded
loans between t and t − 1 and is negative in the opposite case. (ii) We then aggregate
individual adjusted growth rates over the share of the population of banks for which ˜ git is
positive, as follows: POSt = ΣN




We calculate a similar measure for banks for which we observe a decrease in loans ˜ git < 0,
NEGt = ΣN
i|˜ git<0|˜ git|[0.5 ∗ (lit−1 + lit)/ΣN
i=1lit−1]=ΣN
i|∆˜ lit<0∆˜ lit/ΣN
i=1lit−1. (iii) With these two
measures of credit expansion (POSt) and credit contraction (NEGt), we can deﬁne the
net growth rate of credit as their diﬀerence, NETt = POSt − NEGt and a measure of
reallocation in excess of the net credit change EXCt = POSt + NEGt − |NETt|. We will
use these measures to discuss nominal ﬂows.
We then construct measures of idiosyncratic loan ﬂows that compare individual loan changes
13to an aggregate economy-wide trend (i.e., the trend component of the Hodrick-Prescott
ﬁltered growth rate of aggregate loans, with a parameter of 1600 for quarterly data).16 The
idiosyncratic growth rate of a bank-speciﬁc ﬂow b git is then given by b git = ˜ git −gHP
t (i.e., the
diﬀerence between the adjusted measure ˜ git and the trend of aggregate credit growth gHP
t ).
Similar to the case of nominal ﬂows, we can deﬁne the net growth rate relative to trend as
\ NET t = [ POSt − \ NEGt, and a measure of aggregate expansion and contraction relative to
trend growth as \ SUMt = [ POSt + \ NEGt.
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IV Results: 1999-2008
Nominal and Idiosyncratic Gross Credit Flows
Credit expansion and contraction series are plotted in Figure 5 for our measures for total
loans between 1979 and 2008, in Figure 2 for total loans and loans by type between 1999
and 2008, and in Figure 3 for total loans by bank size. All these ﬁgures plot the nominal
series in the graphs at the top of the ﬁgure and the idiosyncratic series in the graphs at
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t ) during the same period. Although the series follow similar patterns, some minor
14discrepancies appear.
Observing our nominal series from a historical perspective shows, ﬁrst, that there are signif-
icant gross ﬂows at any point of the cycle in any of these series, either total loans or loans
disaggregated by type, state, and bank size. Second, credit expansion in the past 10 years is
larger in magnitude and more volatile than in the previous 20 years while credit contraction
has a similar volatility and average over our sample as in the previous 20 years. Third,
the coexistence of expansions and contractions in lending growth are observable across loan
types, bank sizes, and U.S. states. (See online appendix.) These observations suggest that
the large gross ﬂows we observe at the aggregate level do not mainly reﬂect portfolio real-
location (e.g., increasing specialization) because we also ﬁnd that sizeable ﬂows exist within
each category of loans. Moreover, the ﬁgures show that large gross ﬂows exist for banks of
all sizes, so the aggregate ﬂows do not merely reﬂect the heterogeneous behavior of banks of
diﬀerent sizes.
The idiosyncratic growth rates for the 1979-99 period follow patterns similar to the growth
of nominal ﬂows, but some diﬀerences emerge in the estimated series for total loans for
the most recent period (compare the top and the bottom graphs in Figure 5). However,
the interpretation of the idiosyncratic ﬂows is somewhat diﬀerent because these series take
into account the fact that aggregate credit is growing along a trend. The idiosyncratic
ﬂows also better display the heterogeneous behavior of individual banks’ loan decisions. In
Table 1 we ﬁnd that gross ﬂows are sizeable even as a deviation from trend. Idiosyncratic
credit expansion and contraction are roughly balanced at approximately 2.7 percent (credit
contraction is slightly larger than expansion), which is 0.6 percent larger than in the period
151979:Q2-1999:Q2. This means that a signiﬁcant number of banks expand and contract credit
in excess of trend credit growth. We also ﬁnd that credit expansion is more volatile than
credit contraction. We ﬁnd a 13 percent larger coeﬃcient of variation for credit expansion
(0.36) than Dell’Ariccia and Garibaldi (2005), who calculated a coeﬃcient of variation of
0.32 for aggregate ﬂows from 1979 to 1999 and the same coeﬃcient of variation for credit
contraction of 0.42. This conﬁrms the asymmetry in the composition of gross ﬂows.
Types of Loans. In Figure 2 we plot total loans and three types of loans - namely, real
estate loans, C&I loans, and loans to individuals.
The ﬁrst of the four graphs shows how net credit has expanded continuously between the
2001 and the 2008 recessions. The lack of noticeable credit contraction until October 2008
plotted in Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (2008) is evident also in our constructed series
based on micro data, at least until the end of September 2008. Total credit expansion by
U.S. commercial banks was ﬂat during the ﬁrst three quarters of 2008 when credit contraction
was increasing for all types of loans. Hence, if signs of distress were present in this segment
of the banking sector, they do not appear in our estimated series, except for suggesting
lower-than-average expansion. With only these series based on extended loans at hand, we
would not be able to single out a credit crisis episode in 2007-2008, as other periods show
similar patterns (for example, the 2001 recession; see Figure 5). The fourth quarter of data,
however, changes the picture: The steep increase of credit contraction combined with a
further decline of credit expansion for total loans displays a pattern that is similar only to
the 1990-91 recession when compared to recessions over the past three decades. These years
also witnessed the peak of the Savings and Loan crisis with about 1,000 thrift failures, of
16which 675 occurred between 1989 and 1991 (Curry and Shibut, 2000).
The summary statistics in Table 1 also show that gross ﬂows are signiﬁcantly larger than net
ﬂows during the period we study. Average quarterly net credit growth of 3.1 percent is due
to an increase of 4.4 percent in expansion and an increase of 1.3 percent in credit contraction,
consistent with Dell’Ariccia and Garibaldi (2005). We ﬁnd that excess credit reallocation
is 2.6 percent per quarter (i.e., approximately $158 billion is reallocated on average each
quarter, based on average quarterly loan ﬂows of $5.3 trillion).
Types of loans. During the current recession, the three types of loans also show a pattern
similar to the pattern of total loans during the early 1990s recession, with some nuances.
Because the value of real estate loans averages 51 percent of the value of total loans granted
by banks in the Call Report data between 2001 and 2008, real estate loans clearly play a
major role in the evolution of the expansion and contraction series for total loans.
The time series for individual loans and C&I loans are remarkably similar to the series
for real estate loans. However, the series for individual loans are generally more volatile
(descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1 ), and we observe various instances during which
net ﬂows did not grow during the 1999-2008 period; this is the outcome of a large credit
contraction observation matched by an equally large credit expansion observation. More
recently, individual credit has expanded more than it has contracted, except for 2008:Q4
when despite negative net growth, both expansion and contraction increased steeply. The
series for C&I loans are relatively less volatile than for real estate or individual loans and
show clearly that the impact of the 2001 recession continued well into 2003-04. After this
period, credit appears to have expanded vigorously until the 2008 slowdown. Notice also that
17the correlations with the cyclical component of GDP for C&I ﬂows are the highest among
various types of ﬂows (Table 2 ). Our series show lower expansion and larger contraction in
the ﬁrst three quarters of 2008, but the net eﬀect implies a positive net credit expansion.
Unlike the data from the 2001 recession, the Call Report data at this point do not show clear
signs of distress in the C&I loan segment of the banking industry, at least through the end
of September 2008. The measures for 2008:Q4, as in the case of total loans and real estate
loans, show a steep increase in contraction paired with a decrease in expansion.
One of the reasons real estate loans did not contract until the fourth quarter of 2008 is the
sharp decrease in the cost of reﬁnancing mortgages. We collected the Mortgage Bankers
Association (MBA) weekly indices of reﬁnancing and purchasing along with the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddy Mac) average ﬁxed rate for 30-year mortgages,
and normalized the index to 100 at the end of 2007. The unconditional correlation between
the MBA reﬁnancing indices and the average ﬁxed rate is -0.90, while the correlation between
the normalized MBA purchasing rate and the average ﬁxed rate is -0.20. These correlations
indicate that falling rates on mortgages may have triggered a wave of reﬁnancing, which
manifested itself as net growth of real estate loans in our 2008:Q3 observation. However,
these are only correlations and should not be interpreted as causative as we provide no formal
proof.
Bank Size. Since much of the aggregate character of loans is determined by the largest
banks, we investigated whether the patterns we observe across all banks change if we segre-
gate banks into groups by size. Figure 3 shows the behavior of nominal credit expansion and
contraction for banks in the top 10 percent, top 25 percent, or bottom 75 percent ranked
18by the value of total loans of the bank in 2007:Q1. We ﬁnd that the volatility in credit ex-
pansion is largely driven by banks in the top decile of banks by size, while the banks in the
lower three quartiles had much smoother patterns of credit expansion, though their credit
contraction was slightly more volatile. Large idiosyncratic gross credit ﬂows coexist within
each bank size decile and these ﬂows increased in our sample compared with those in the
previous two decades. When measuring gross ﬂows as the sum of idiosyncratic expansions
and contractions, \ SUM, by bank size decile, we ﬁnd that \ SUM is 3.5 percent for the ﬁrst
(lowest) decile and 4.2 percent for the 10th or highest decile.18 Thus, a signiﬁcant amount
of heterogeneity exists even among banks of the same size. We also ﬁnd that a signiﬁcant
amount of the volatility of idiosyncratic credit expansion is driven by the lending behavior
of banks in the top quartile (see Figure 3), while the behavior of idiosyncratic credit con-
traction is much more similar across banks in all quantiles. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that for
relatively smaller banks (those in the lower 75 percentile of the distribution), the increase in
idiosyncratic credit contraction following the 2001 recession was large enough to lead to a
net credit contraction (among these banks) even though idiosyncratic credit expansion was
about average at the time.
Looking at the current recession, we ﬁnd that idiosyncratic contraction among the smaller
banks is small and not markedly increasing through the fourth quarter of 2008, whereas
contraction rose between the ﬁrst and last quarters of 2008 among banks in both the top 10
and top 25 percentiles of the distribution. The changes in idiosyncratic expansion during 2008
were also driven by banks in the top quartile, with a marked increase in contraction during
the fourth quarter of 2008 for these banks. Overall, the number of banks that contracted
19credit between the third and fourth quarters of 2008 actually increased. This behavior does
not match that of the 2001 recession, when the behavior of credit expansion and contraction
among smaller banks was similar to the behavior observed in larger banks.
The most interesting result from the breakdown by size is that the relatively smaller banks
show little impact from the recession that began in 2007. Their credit growth was positive
and comparable to, if not larger, than previous years. Naturally, because the larger banks
control a disproportionately larger share of loans, the behavior of gross ﬂows in the top decile
and top quartile of the distribution drives the behavior of total loans.
The Role of Unused Commitments
Although the volume of loans did not contract until the fourth quarter of 2008, credit ex-
pansion was at best weak during the previous three quarters (see Figure 2). The decline of
syndicated lending - the primary source of credit for large corporations - began in mid-2007
and accelerated as the crisis grew. However, many of these loans to large corporations are
not held in the commercial banking sector and so are not reported in the Call Reports.
We oﬀer two ideas, suggested by anecdotal evidence, that might explain the lack of signiﬁ-
cant contraction. First, it is possible that ﬁrms and commercial businesses face diﬃculties in
other credit markets, particularly in the market for commercial paper issued by non-ﬁnancial
corporations as well as in bond issues. Second, it is possible that ﬁrms are drawing from
existing lines of credit available at commercial banks but these banks may not be granting
new loans. Thus, the dramatic decline in syndicated bank lending may have prompted ﬁrms
to tap into unused credit at commercial banks to a greater degree. This is consistent with
Figure 4, which shows that total unused loan commitments of various types and maturities
20peaked in the second half of 2007 and have since declined through the fourth quarter of 2008,
with a steep 17 percent drop by the end of 2008 (previously, the rate of decline had been
approximately 1.5 percent per quarter). Considering the ratio of unused commitments to
total loans, we ﬁnd that the peak in this ratio occurred much earlier, in the ﬁrst quarter of
2002, and the ratio has since steadily declined. The decline in this ratio could be due to one
or both of two factors: a decrease in new commitments or an increase in total loans taken
under preexisting commitments. Since unused commitments peak much later, it seems clear
that the decline in the ratio of commitments to loans is due to the increase in total loans
at least through the second half of 2007 rather than a reduction in unused commitments.
The reduction in unused commitments was led by a steep fourth-quarter decline in credit
card lines as well as continuing declines in unused credit lines to ﬁrms (both secured by real
estate and unsecured). Home equity credit lines also decreased by 4 percent after increasing
by 3 percent in the third quarter. The ratio of other unused commitments (credit lines to
ﬁrms) to C&I loans increased in the fourth quarter, in this case driven by the steep decline in
C&I loans. This observation is consistent with the fact that commercial lending is strongly
procyclical.
Hence, the Call Report data indeed suggest that there has been an increase in the use of credit
lines available for C&I loans. Now, if this increased drawdown of unused commitments signals
diﬃculty in securing credit elsewhere, excess available credit may be working as insurance
(or backup credit) for ﬁrms (Morgan, 1998).
Demand, Supply, and the Senior Loan Oﬃcer Survey
Our ﬂow measures provide no information whether banks are tightening credit standards or
21whether borrowers are demanding less credit - that is, whether the decrease in the volume
of loans comes from reduced demand by households and ﬁrms or from a credit squeeze on
the supply side. A look at aggregate data from the H8 release reveals a small decrease in
credit that appears to be consistent with the decreases observed during previous recessions,
and certainly with the 2001 recession. It should be kept in mind that the U.S. Treasury and
the Federal Reserve System have created and implemented many new programs aimed at
supporting ﬁnancial intermediation after September 2008 and these programs are expected
to aﬀect commercial bank lending.
Although establishing whether a decrease in loans is due to lower demand or to a credit
squeeze is diﬃcult, some insight may be gained from a survey of senior loan oﬃcers at major
banks across the nation carried out by the Federal Reserve System on a quarterly basis, the
Senior Loan Oﬃcer Survey on Bank Lending Practices, publicly available on the website of
the Board of Governors.19 The survey asks senior loan oﬃcers for their perceptions about
the supply and demand side of various types of loans - namely, C&I loans extended to
large, medium, and small ﬁrms and mortgage and consumer loans. The series are the net
percentage of oﬃcers of domestic banks who responded that they see tightening standards
for these types of loans and the net percentage of oﬃcers reporting stronger demand for
a speciﬁc type of loan, for example, mortgage loans. In the case of the current recession,
the net percentage of respondents reporting stronger demand for loans has fallen to levels
comparable to those observed during the 2001 recession for commercial real estate and by
much less for other loans requested by all sizes of ﬁrms. Hence, to this point, the demand
for loans would appear to have weakened to levels comparable to the previous recession.
22However, as these are relative measures, all we can say with certainty is that demand has
fallen and it is unclear how comparable the depth of the fall is between the two recession.
A similar trend can be observed for mortgage and consumer loans, with the latter faring
particularly poorly and mirroring the drop in aggregate consumption in the second part of
2008. The net percentage of respondents reporting tightening standards has increased for
several quarters in 2007/8, to levels similar to those observed in the 1991 recession, and even
higher levels for mortgage and consumers loans, for which the series reached a historical
high in 2008:Q4. Again, to be strictly correct, all we can say is that lending standards are
tightened. We cannot conclusively compare the tightness in standards during this recession
and previous ones. These ﬁve measures show some improvement in the latest survey available
at the time of this writing administered in January/February 2009. Therefore, the Survey
seems to suggest not only that banks are tightening standards, possibly screening applicants
with more eﬀort than previously, but also that the eﬀects of the recession are being observed
in the demand for loans.
Cyclical Properties
We describe the cyclical properties of gross ﬂows in Table 2 (series in levels). Aggregate
ﬂows are more volatile than GDP, but not nearly as volatile as they were in the previous 20
years. Expansions are about as volatile as contractions, not only for aggregate loans but also
for individual loans. The volatility of the contraction series for C&I loans and real estate
loans is larger than that of expansion. However, our volatility ﬁndings may be due to our
relatively short time series (for purposes of considering cyclical properties) and the fact that
it includes only one full recession (2001) and the beginning of the current recession, so we
23interpret them cautiously.
From Table 2, we ﬁnd that credit expansion in total loans is procyclical (with GDP), con-
traction is countercyclical, and excess reallocation of credit is countercyclical. The cyclical
behavior of the components of aggregate ﬂows follows distinct sectoral patterns. C&I loan
expansion and contraction displays cyclical behavior similar to that of aggregate loans, al-
though the correlation with GDP is much higher. Real estate loans show lower contempo-
raneous correlations with GDP, while individual loans exhibit much lower correlations with
the cyclical component of GDP and excess reallocation is procyclical. It appears that the
asymmetry in the behavior of contractions and expansions comes from adjustment within
individual banks and loan categories rather than aggregate shocks. In general, it is more
diﬃcult for banks to adjust to a positive shock quickly. We see anecdotal evidence of the
length of this adjustment process in the current recession when banks are being pressured
to expand lending quickly. Conversely, it is relatively easier to reduce credit in response to
a negative shock as banks can refuse to roll over debt, reduce credit lines, and place stricter
conditions on new loans. The diﬀerences in the volatility of expansion and contraction may
be related to these supply side considerations, though we oﬀer no formal proof here. The
relation to the demand side is not as clear.
Comparison of Diﬀerent Recessions
We examine the behavior of gross credit ﬂows for ﬁve recessions, two from our sample
data and three from the Dell’Ariccia and Garibaldi (2005) sample. We show that credit
contraction tends to increase during recessions while credit expansion decreases. For the
overall U.S. economy, our estimates show a cross-sectional reduction of net credit only in
24rare occasions, most notably during and after the 1991 recession, an occasion that was
related to the severity of the Savings and Loan crisis. However, the typical pattern of other
recessions, including the recession that began in 2007 through the third quarter of 2008, is
a drop of credit expansion and a sharp increase in credit contraction, but which generally
leaves net ﬂow growth positive although small.
Gross bank loan ﬂows behaved similarly over three of the past ﬁve recessions (1980, 1981-82,
and 2001). During the 1991 recession gross bank ﬂows behaved quite diﬀerently. The start of
the current recession appears very similar to the 1980 and 2001 recessions, but adding data
for 2008:Q4 makes the pattern more similar to the beginning of the 1990-91 recession (see
Figure 5). In the 1980 and 1981-82 recessions, net credit followed a “V”- shaped pattern,
with credit expansion falling quickly below trend just before and during the recession and
rebounding sharply immediately following the trough in economic activity; credit contraction
followed the opposite pattern, rising quickly above trend and falling sharply after the trough.
In general, the drop in credit expansion and the rise in credit contraction exhibited little
persistence in these two recessions. In the 1991 recession, however, the decline in credit
expansion and the increase in contraction were persistent, lasting for two years into the
recovery (there was also a fair amount of persistence of low expansion and high contraction
following the 2001 recession). In part, this was due to the Savings and Loan crisis, which
began roughly ﬁve years before the 1991 recession and was not fully resolved for four years
after the recession. During this crisis, over 1,000 U.S. thrift institutions with combined
assets of over $500 billion in current dollars failed (see Curry and Shibut, 2000). In the 1991
recession, the increase in credit contraction accounted for approximately 50 percent of the
25reduction in net credit, while in previous recessions credit contraction displayed little change
in absolute terms.
In Figure 5 we plot the cyclical components of the levels of credit expansion and credit
contraction around NBER-dated recessions. Qualitatively, the cyclical behavior of the credit
expansion series during the recession that began in 2007 (darker line) appears remarkably
similar to those of the 1981-82 and 1990-91 recessions. During the Savings and Loan crisis
(which ended in 1994), the negative cyclical component of the credit expansion series was
large and highly persistent for many quarters after the end of the recession, as was the
positive cyclical component of the credit contraction series. At the time, the increase in
credit contraction accounted for most of the negative change in net credit, generating a so-
called creditless recovery. Conversely, the cyclical components of the contraction and the
expansion series around the 2001 recession display a proﬁle that looks more similar to that of
the 1980 recession, when the cyclical component of contraction was above that of expansion
only for four quarters.
During the 1991 recession, there was also a large and persistent increase in excess credit
reallocation of up to 4.2 percent at the time of the trough in economic activity (1991:Q1),
which remained in the 4 percent range through 1992. The persistent aggregate excess re-
allocation during the 1991 recession may have been driven by changes in the regulatory and
market structure of the banking system. During the 2001 recession, by contrast, excess credit
reallocation was as high as 6.2 percent at the trough in economic activity (2001:Q4), but it
returned to its average in 2002:Q3. So far, in the recession that started in 2007:Q4, excess
credit reallocation is slightly above average (but not as high as during the 2001 recession).
26It is possible that further quarterly data will reveal a creditless recovery similar to that
following the Savings and Loan crisis.
V Conclusions
In this paper, we described gross credit loans of U.S. commercial banks between the ﬁrst
quarter of 1999 and the fourth quarter of 2008. We compared our measures with the evidence
for previous years and found that the credit expansion series is substantially more volatile
than it was before 1999, while the credit contraction series is remarkably similar. We found
that excess credit reallocation remains signiﬁcant at around 3 percent of total quarterly
loans, implying signiﬁcant informational costs. We also found that individual and real estate
loans had similar cyclical properties but diﬀered from the properties of total loans, while
commercial loan behavior was similar to that of total loans. Signiﬁcant heterogeneity among
banks of diﬀerent sizes and across U.S. states continues to persist, while regional trends in
loan expansion and contraction may be increasingly signiﬁcant at the aggregate level.
Regarding the ﬁnancial crisis that began in 2007, we described the evolution of bank lending
to understand why the behavior of total loans and the components of total loans show little
sign of distress in the ﬁrst three quarters of 2008. Real estate, individual, and commercial
loans expanded between the ﬁrst and third quarters of 2008, albeit at a rate that was below
trend. However, the fourth quarter marks the beginning of a credit contraction similar to
one that occurred during the 1990-91 recession and the peak of the Savings and Loan crisis.
Our results also help to reconcile the arguments made in CCK (2008) and CDFM (2008).
They are consistent with the ﬁrst paper because our measures show that no evidence of
27the credit crunch was visible in the data on the quantity of loans extended by commercial
banks, at the time of those authors’ writing. With only series that measure quantities at
hand through the third quarter of 2008, we would not have been able to single out a credit
contraction episode. Moreover, our results provide support to the second paper’s argument
because the larger use of credit commitments appears to have postponed the contraction of
net lending to the last quarter of 2008. Future data will reveal new important information
on the extent and the persistence of the contraction, and perhaps on the eﬀect of some
of the new programs implemented by the Treasury and the Federal Reserve to ease credit
conditions in this segment of the credit market.
At this time, credit expansion and contraction behavior looks very similar to the pattern
of credit during the recession of 1990-91 that also witnessed the peak of the Savings and
Loan crisis. We observe a contraction in net credit only at the end of 2008, while credit
expansion remains below trend and contraction is above trend. It remains to be seen whether
net commercial banks credit will contract throughout the current recession or will start
expanding again in the ﬁrst quarter of 2009.
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30Notes
1Our approach to describe gross loan ﬂows mirrors the approach to gross job ﬂow dynamics popularized by Davis, Halti-
wanger, and Schuh (1996). According to this literature, net employment changes in the overall economy can be computed as
the diﬀerence between gross job creation by ﬁrms which expand employment, and gross job destruction by ﬁrms which reduce
employment.
2For a study of the determinants of bank failures and acquisitions in the United States, see Wheelock and Wilson (2000).
3Our raw data for 2008 include four ﬁnancial entities that acquired charters as commercial banks and are now ﬁling Call
Reports, namely, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, and American Express. We excluded these entities for the
purpose of this paper to maintain comparability with earlier periods. When we include these four newly chartered entities,
the only diﬀerence is that credit contraction is slightly larger in 2008:Q3. Instead, the acquisition of Washington Mutual by
JPMorgan Chase in 2008:Q3 requires particular care for reasons that we explain in detail in Section 3.
4We take loan commitments into consideration in determining to what extent the crisis was fueled by demand versus supply
side considerations in Section IV.
5http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h8/data.htm.
6See online appendix at http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/more/2009-011/.
7See Anderson (2008) for details about this program.
8We refer the interested reader to these papers for precise details about the debate. These papers make several other
interesting points that we omit simply because they are less relevant for our analysis.
9Syndicated loans made to large companies are loans originated by large banks and then sold by the originator to a syndicate
of ﬁnancial institutions, including those who structure collateralized debt obligations.
10http://www.chicagofed.org/economic research and data/commercial bank data.cfm.
11Similar information is publicly available in the Bank Holding Company Data (http://www.chicagofed.org/economic
research and data/bhc data.cfm) available at the Chicago Fed website.
12Note that Citigroup initially stepped forward to purchase Wachovia, but that takeover was aborted on Oct. 9, 2008, when
Wells Fargo staked its claim.
13A thrift is a ﬁnancial institution whose activity focuses on taking deposits and originating home mortgages.
14https://cdr.ﬃec.gov/public/ManageFacsimiles.aspx.
15For an analysis of the bank practice of lending to insolvent ﬁrms in Japan, see Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008).
16We calculate idiosyncratic loan ﬂows for consistency with the data series calculated by Dell’Ariccia and Garibaldi (2005).
Our tests show that the growth rates of credit are trend stationary and therefore Hodrik-Prescott ﬁltering is appropriate.
17The entire series are available from the authors. The patterns are remarkably similar to the un-amended series that can be
reconstructed until 2008:Q2.
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t exclude JPMorgan Chase. These series are plotted only for the recession that began in 2007. The entire
series and their plots are available from the authors. The top four ﬁgures are quarterly nominal gross ﬂows, the
bottom four are quarterly idiosyncratic ﬂows. Shaded areas represent NBER recession quarters. The thicker line
represents a measure of credit expansion that can be approximately interpreted as the weighted growth rate of loans
for institutions that increased lending between any two quarters. The thinner line represents a measure of credit
contraction that can be approximately interpreted as the weighted growth rate of loans for institutions that reduced
lending between any two quarters. The weights are the ratio between the value of credit extended by each bank and
total aggregate lending. The measures of idiosyncratic ﬂows are computed similarly, but after subtracting the trend
of the growth rate of aggregate lending from individual growth rates.
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t exclude JPMorgan Chase. These series are plotted only for the recession that
began in 2007. The entire series and their plots are available from the authors. The top top ﬁgures are quarterly
nominal gross ﬂows, the bottom four are quarterly idiosyncratic ﬂows. Shaded areas represent NBER recession
quarters. The thicker line represents a measure of credit expansion that can be approximately interpreted as the
weighted growth rate of loans for institutions that increased lending between any two quarters. The thinner line
represents a measure of credit contraction that can be approximately interpreted as the weighted growth rate of loans
for institutions that reduced lending between any two quarters. The weights are the ratio between the value of credit
extended by each bank and total aggregate lending. The measures of idiosyncratic ﬂows are computed similarly, but
after subtracting the trend of the growth rate of aggregate lending from individual growth rates.
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